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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRMAN MILLINER and GEORGE 
A. BURCH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
ELMER FOX & COMPANY, DON A. 
STRINGHAM, L A R R Y M. FOL-
L E T T , and STRINGHAM AND 
FOLLETT, a professional corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ELMER FOX & COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs allege that they purchased stock in Com-
mercial liquidators, Inc., a Utah corporation, in part in 
reliance upon financial statements prepared by Defen-
dant, Elmer Fox & Company, that as a result of negli-
gence on the part of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, 
the financial statements were totally inaccurate, false and 
misleading and that Plaintiffs have suffered damage as a 
result of their purchase of said stock. 
Case No. 
13520 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company made a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Judge, granted said motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, seeks affirmance 
of the lower Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, generally agrees 
with the facts as set forth in Appellants' brief, but desires 
to bring additional facts to the attention of the Court as 
well as clarify some of the facts set forth by Appellants. 
It should be pointed out that a separate motion to 
dismiss was made by Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, 
and Defendants, Don A. Stringham, Larry M. Follett and 
Stringham and Follett, and both motions were granted 
by the lower Court. 
The argument of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, 
at the hearing on the Defendants' motions to dismiss was 
that Plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted and that Plaintiff had failed 
to join indispensable parties. As to the first ground for 
dismissal Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company argued that 
it could not be liable for negligence to a third party with 
whom it was not in privity in the preparation of the finan-
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cial statements in question and that no private cause of 
action exists for a violation of Section 61-1-1 of the Utah 
Code Annotated. 
On the second basis for the motion to dismiss of De-
fendant, Elmer Fox & Company — failure to join indis-
pensable parties — said Defendant argued that the Plain-
tiffs had, in violation of Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, intentionally failed to join Commer-
cial Liquidators, Inc. (the corporation from which they 
allegedly purchased the securities in question), Boyd 
Madsen (the president of Commercial Liquidators, Inc.), 
Dennis Madsen (the son of Boyd Madsen who was en-
trusted with property of Commercial Liquidators, Inc. 
and who apparently used said property as his own) and 
others. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS MUST ALLEGE PRIVITY OF 
C O N T R A C T BETWEEN THEMSELVES 
AND DEFENDANT, ELMER FOX & COM-
PANY IN ORDER TO STATE A C L A I M 
AGAINST SAID D E F E N D A N T UPON 
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
A careful reading of Counts II and III of Plaintiffs' 
complaint, the only counts which sound against Defen-
dant, Elmer Fox & Company, will clearly show that there 
is no allegation of privity between said Defendant and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiffs. On the contrary, the allegations in the com-
plaint (see paragraph 16 of Count II) , and the facts as 
stated in Appellants' brief, (see item 2.a under FACTS) 
show that the financial statements were prepared by 
Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company at the request of and 
for Commercial Liquidators, Inc. No privity between said 
Defendant and Plaintiffs is alleged by Plaintiffs and with-
out such an allegation Plaintiffs have failed to state 
a claim for professional misrepresentation against Defen-
dant, Elmer Fox & Company upon which relief can be 
granted. 
The leading case in the area of accountants' responsi-
bility to third parties is the case of Ultramares Corp. v. 
Towche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), cited and 
quoted from in Plaintiffs' brief. In Ultramares the Court 
of Appeals of New York speaking through Chief Justice 
Cardozo reasoned that it would be contrary to public 
policy to impose liability upon accountants in an inde-
terminate amount, to an indeterminate class and for an 
indeterminate time. The Court, therefore, limited such 
potential liability by ruling that to be liable for negligence 
an accountant must be in privity of contract with the 
claimant and that an accountant is liable to third parties 
only for fraud. 
It does no more than say that, if less than this 
is proved, if there has been neither reckless mis-
statement nor insincere profession of an opinion, 
but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for 
negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, 
and is to be enforced between the parties by 
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whom the contract has been made. We doubt 
whether the average businessman receiving a 
certificate without paying for it, and receiving 
it merely as one among a multitude of possible 
investors, would look for anything more. 
Id. at 189, 174 N. E. at 448. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged fraud against Defendant, 
Elmer Fox & Company, and their complaint cannot be 
construed to sound in fraud against said Defendant for 
if it were so construed it would run afoul of the require-
ment of Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
that fraud be pled with particularity. 
The case of Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. 
Supp. 85 (D. R. I. 1968), quoted in part by Plaintiffs on 
page 6 of their brief, does not stand for the proposition, 
as appears to be Plarintiffs' reading of the case, that an 
accountant is liable for negligence in preparation of finan-
cial statements to any and all third parties who may at 
some time rely upon the financials in some possible way. 
On the contrary, all that the court in Rusch Factors held 
was that an accountant may be liable in negligence for 
careless financial misrepresentations relied upon by ac-
tually foreseen and limited classes of persons who are 
not in privity with the accountant. 
With respect, then to the plaintiffs' negli-
gence theory, this Court holds that an accoun-
tant should be liable in negligence for careless 
financial misrepresentations relied upon by ac-
tually foreseen and limited classes of persons. 
According to the plaintiff's complaint in the in-
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stant case, the defendant knew that his certifi-
cation was to be used for, and had as its very 
aim and purpose, the reliance of potential finan-
ciers of the Rhode Island corporation. 
Id. at 92-93. 
Clearly the Plaintiffs in this case are not members of 
a class actually foreseen by Defendant, Elmer Fox & Com-
pany as going to rely upon the financial statements pre-
pared by it. Moreover, even if said Defendant had actually 
foreseen potential stockholders as a class of persons who 
might rely upon the financial statements such a class is 
not a "limited class" as required by the Court in Rusch 
Factors. Indeed to extend the potential liability of ac-
countants for negligence to all persons who in purchasing 
stock in a public company at some unknown time might 
possibly rely upon financial statements prepared by them 
would clearly have the result which Chief Justice Cardozo 
foresaw in Ultramares and which the Court in that case, 
as well as the Court in Rusch Factors, wisely avoided. 
A different question develops when we ask 
whether they owed a duty to these to make it 
without negligence. If liability for negligence 
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of 
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a 
liability in an indeterminate amount for an in-
determinate time to an indeterminate class. The 
hazards of a business conducted on these terms 
are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a 
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty 
that exposes to these consequences. 
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Uitramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 179-80, 174 
N.E. 441,444 (1931). 
Section 552 of the proposed draft of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, cited and quoted in part on page 7 
of Appellants' brief, goes no further than the Court in 
Rusch Factors and limits third party liability of profes-
sionals for negligent misrepresentation to those persons 
for whose benefit and guidance the representation is sup-
plied or to whom they know the recipient intends to sup-
ply it. 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, pro-
fession or employment, or in a transaction in 
which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable 
reliance upon the information, if he fails to ex-
ercise reasonable care or competence in obtain-
ing or communicating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the 
liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to 
loss suffered 
(a) By the person or one of the persons for 
whose benefit and guidance he intends to 
supply the information, or knows that the 
recipient intends to supply it; and 
(b) Through reliance upon it in a transaction 
which he intends the information to in-
fluence, or knows that the recipient so in-
tends, or in a substantially similar transac-
tion. 
(3) The lability of one who is under a public 
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duty to give the information extends to loss 
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose 
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transac-
tions in which it is intended to protect them. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 
12, 1966). 
The limited scope of proposed section 552 is indicated 
by note 2 to the proposed section. 
2. Where the defendant merely supplies infor-
mation for the recipient to use as he sees fit, with-
out any purpose of his own to reach third per-
sons, a narrower rule is required. It is not enough 
that it is "foreseeable" that the information will 
reach third persons. In one sense it is always 
"foreseeable" that any information will be com-
municated to others. Something more is re-
quired. This is made very clear by a long list of 
cases holding that one who negligently gives a 
certificate, or other information, to A is not liable 
when it reaches B and causes pecuniary loss to 
him in the absence of some information as to A's 
intent to reach B. 
Id. Note 2 at 15 (Citing Ultramares and other cases on 
the question of accountants' liability to third parties). 
The great weight of authority continues to support 
the position of the New York Court of Appeals in Ultra-
mares that an accountant is not liable for mere negligence 
to parties with whom he is not in privity. See Stephens 
Industries, Inc. v. Haskins and Sells, 438 F. 2d 357, 359 
(10th Oir. 1971). Also those courts which have expanded 
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the scope of Ultramares have done so only to a limited 
degree so as to allow members of limited and foreseen 
classes of third parties to state a claim for negligent mis-
representation against accountants although not in privity 
with them. See 46 A. L. R. 3d 979 (1972) and cases cited 
therein. The trend in the law, if it is one, is not, as Plain-
tiffs would have the Court believe, a wholesale rejection 
of the Ultramares case, but is merely a new means of 
limiting the scope of accountants' potential liability for 
negligence and is not an invitation to the kind of inde-
terminate liability to and indeterminate class for an in-
determinate time that the Ultramares rule was designed 
to avoid. Even under the most liberal of the more recent 
cases on this issue, the Plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim for relief against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company 
for professional misrepresentation upon which relief can 
be granted and their complaint was therefore properly 
dismissed by the lower Court. 
POINT II. 
NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS 
FOR A VIOLATION OF SECTION 61-1-1 OF 
THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, which 
is Section 1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, provides 
as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale or purchase of any security 
directly or indirectly 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1968). 
Even a cursory reading of Section 61-1-1 will indicate 
to the reader that the section does not by its own terms 
create a private cause of action for its violation. A review 
of the entire Utah Uniform Securities Act will further 
show that the only section of the Act which does create 
a private cause of action is Section 61-1-22 which is quoted 
below: 
Any person who 
(a) offers or sells a security in violation of 
section 61-1-3 (1), 61-1-7, or 61-1-17 (2) or of 
any rule or order under section 61-1-15 which re-
quires the affirmative approval of sales literature 
before it is used, or of any condition imposed un-
der section 61-1-10 (4), 61-1-11 (7), or 
(b) offers or sells a security by means of 
any untrue statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the 
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untruth or omission), and who does not sustain 
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in 
the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to 
the person buying the security from him, who 
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at six per cent per year from the date of 
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, 
less the amount of any income received on the 
security, upon the tender of the security or for 
damages if he no longer owns the security. Dam-
ages are the amount that would be recoverable 
upon a tender less the value of the security when 
the buyer disposed of it and interest at six per 
cent per year from the date of disposition. 
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly 
controls a seller liable under subsection (1), 
every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, 
every person occupying a similar status or per-
forming a similar function, every employee of 
such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and 
every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids 
in the sale are also liable jointly and severally 
with and to the same extent as the seller, unless 
the nonseller who is so liable sustains the burden 
of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of the 
existence of the facts by reason of which the 
liability is alleged to exist. There is contribu-
tion as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (1968). 
Subsection (1) (a) of Section 61-1-22 specifically 
creates a cause of action for violation of Sections 61-1-3 
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(1), 61-1-17 and 61-1-17 (2), but does not create a cause 
of action for violation of Section 61-1-1 of the Act. Since 
Section 61-1-22 in particular and the Act in general do 
not provide for a cause of action for violation of Section 
61-1-1 none exists. 
Plaintiffs in their brief (on page 9 thereof) main-
tain that unless a private cause of action for violation of 
Section 61-1-1 exists only persons who sell or buy stock 
can be held liable for fraud and those who aid or abet 
them cannot be held liable for their unlawful actions. This 
argument, however, overlooks the express provisions of 
subsection (2) of Section 61-1-22, quoted above, which 
creates an express cause of action against certain parties 
who aid or abet a seller or buyer. 
The final argument made by Plaintiffs for their posi-
tion that a private cause of action exists for a violation 
of Section 61-1-1 is that such a private cause of action has 
been found to exist with regard to Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 17 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and that the language in these 
sections is "substantially identical to Section 61-1-1". 
First, Plaintiffs cite no case, treatise or other support 
whatsoever for this assertion. Secondly, it is clear from 
a reading of Section 10(b) and Section 17 that there 
exist substantial differences between the language con-
tained therein and the wording of Section 61-1-1 of the 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 reads as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, 
or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change — 
• • • • 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U. S. C. A. § 78j (1971) (emphasis added). 
The provisions of Section 10 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 by their terms are clearly not limited to 
persons who offer or sell a security as is the case with 
Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. The 
start of Section 10 speaks of "any person", clearly all 
encompassing, and subpart (to) limits it only to any per-
son who engaged in the proscribed conduct "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security." This 
language is manifestedly broader than the language of 
Section 61-1-1 which specifically limits its applicability 
in subparts (a) and (b) thereof to one who "offers or 
sells a security". Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defen-
dant, Elmer Fox & Company offered or sold a security 
and without such an allegation they have failed to state 
a claim under the Utah Uniform Securities Act upon 
which relief can be granted. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
As was the case with Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the language of Section 17 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 is different in important respects 
from the wording of Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. Section 17(a) is quoted below: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any 
means or instruments of transportion or com-
munication in interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly — 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, 
or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U. S. C. A. § 77q (1971). 
Like Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, Section 17(a) starts off by broadly applying to 
"any person". Section 17(a) is limited, however, by go-
ing on to state that the persons covered are those who 
engaged in the unlawful conduct "in the offer or sale of 
any securities". The Section is not, as is Section 61-1-1, 
limited to persons who offer or sell securities but covers 
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any person who engage in unlawful conduct "in the offer 
or sell of securities" whether the buyer, seller or a third 
party and is therefore broader in scope than the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. 
The fact that there might exist a private cause of 
action for violation of Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933 and/or of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is not support for Plaintiffs' position 
that such a cause of action exists for violation of Section 
61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. All causes 
of action created by the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
are specifically designated in Section 61-1-22 thereof. No 
reference is made to a cause of action for a violation of 
Section 61-1-1. Moreover, to the extent that subpart 
(1) (b) of that section may be construed to cover viola-
tions of Section 61-1-1, the subpart requires that the party 
sued thereunder have offered or sold a security. Such an 
allegation has not been made by Plaintiffs against De-
fendant, Elmer Fox & Company. 
Finally, subpart (8) of Section 61-1-22 of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act clearly states that the Act does 
not create any cause of action not specified in Section 
61-1-22 or section 61-1-4 (5). 
The rights and remedies provided by this 
act are in addition to any other rights or reme-
dies that may exist at law or in equity, but this 
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act does not create any cause of action not speci-
fied in this section or section 61-1-4 (5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22 (1968) (emphasis added). 
Section 61-1-4 (5) deals with suits on bonds for reg-
istered broker-dealers and is not involved in this case. 
In discussing the effect of this provision, Louis Loss 
in his work on securities regulations says the following: 
At the federal level there is room for the 
recognition of implied liabilities, because (1) 
none of the SEC statutes except the 1933 act 
contains a comprehensive series of express liabil-
ity provisions, and (2) there can be no federal de-
ceit or rescission remedies apart from statute. See 
pages 932-46 supra, 1746-57 infra. But, given a 
statute like the Uniform Securities Act in which 
careful attention was paid to the scope of civil 
liability in the interest of specificity and pre-
dictability, there is no room for implying liabili-
ties which are not expressly created. 
I l l L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1649 n. 100 (1961). 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO JOIN ONE 
OR MORE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
The motion to dismiss of Defendant, Elmer Fox & 
Company in addition to being based upon Rule 12 (b) (6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted was based upon 
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Rule 12 (b) (7) because of Plaintiffs' failure to join one 
or more indispensable parties. Plaintiffs' purchase of stock 
was from Commercial Liquidators, Inc., yet that Com-
pany is not a party to the action. 
Plaintiffs in their brief have quoted from volume 59 
of American Jurisprudence Second Edition on Parties. 
With the first quote from Section 5 of said work, Defen-
dant, Elmer Fox & Company has no quarrel. Nor does 
said Defendant challenge the general principles of law 
set forth in the other three quotes. Defendant, Elmer 
Fox & Company would, however, like to bring additional 
provisions of said work to the Court's attention. 
A person who will be directly affected by a decree 
of a Court on a certain subject is an indispensable party. 
However, indispensable parties may be de-
fined as those persons whose interests in the sub-
ject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound 
up with those of the other parties that their legal 
presence as parties to the proceeding is an abso-
lute necessity. A rule early announced to de-
scribe parties so indispensable that a court of 
equity will not proceed to final decision without 
them, and often applied by the courts and still 
valid today, describes indispensable parties as 
follows: Persons who not only have an interest 
in the controversy, but an interest of such a 
nature that a final decree cannot be made with-
out either affecting that interest or leaving the 
controversy in such a condition that its final de-
termination may be wholly inconsistent with 
equity and good conscience. A person who will 
be directly affected by a decree and whose inter-
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est is not represented by any party to the suit is 
an indispensable party. One may be an indis-
pensable party if his interest in the subject mat-
ter of the controversy is of such a nature that 
a final decree cannot be rendered between the 
other parties to the suit without inevitably 
affecting that interest. 
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 13, at 359-62 (1971) (emphasis 
added and footnotes omitted). 
The reason for the rule is clear. Each party to the 
action, such as Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, should 
have those parties before the Court who are involved in 
the controversy so that complete relief may be had. 
The interests of Commercial Liquidators, Inc., which 
has rescinded its issuance of stock to the Plaintiffs, as 
well as the interests of its president, Boyd Madsen and 
others will be directly affected by any decree issued by 
a Court in this matter and since their interests are not 
represented by any current party to the suit they are 
indispensable parties. 
The lower Court was therefore correct in granting 
the motion to dismiss of Defendant, Elmer Fox & Com-
pany on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to join one or more 
indispensable parties. Moreover, any liability that De-
fendant, Elmer Fox & Company may have to Plaintiffs 
for violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act is a joint 
liability it shares with Commercial Liquidators, Inc., and 
others who, however, have not been joined as defendants 
in this lawsuit. 
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CONCLUSION 
The complaint of Plaintiffs fails to state a claim 
against Defendant, Elmer Fox & Company, upon which 
relief can be granted and Plaintiffs have furthermore 
failed to join one or more indispensable parties. The 
lower Court was, therefore, correct in granting Defen-
dant Elmer Fox & Company's motion to dismiss and said 
action should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEONARD J. LEWIS 
BRENT J. GIAUQUE 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Elmer Fox & Company 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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